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THE CHESAPEAKE BAY CRITICAL AREA COMMISSION 
REGULATIONS: PROCESS OF ENACTMENT AND 
EFFECT ON PRIVATE PROPERTY INTERESTS 
Solomon Lisst 
Lee R. Epsteint 
In 1984, the Maryland General Assembly enacted several 
bills to restore declining water quality and habitat values in the 
Chesapeake Bay, the most controversial of which was the Critical 
Areas Legislation. This article, co-authored by the Chairman of 
the Commission, discusses the creation of the Chesapeake Bay 
Critical Areas Commission and the development of its regula-
tions. The article then examines the constitutional issue raised 
by the Criteria's requirement that certain land areas surround-
ing the Bay have a density of no more than one dwelling unit per 
twenty acres. The authors conclude that this highly debated den-
sity requirement constitutes neither a "taking" of the property 
without just compensation nor a deprivation of property without 
due process. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection Program was the 
most controversial of the laws enacted in 1984 to address the restoration 
of Maryland's most significant natural resource. This legislation created 
a Chesapeake Bay Critical Areas Commission (Commission) and author-
ized the Commission to adopt regulations that establish a resource pro-
tection program for the Bay and its tributaries. 1 The waters and lands 
included in the Commission's planning area are defined in the statute and 
designated as the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area (Critical Area).2 Each 
county, or a municipal corporation with planning and zoning powers, in 
which any part of the Critical Area is located, is responsible for develop-
t Chairman, Chesapeake Bay Critical Areas Commission; Associate Judge (Ret.), 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland; J.D., 1937, University of Baltimore School 
of Law. 
~ Assistant Attorney General, Maryland Department of Natural Resources; B.A., 
1975, Dickinson College; J.D., 1979, The George Washington University; 
M.U.R.P., 1980, The George Washington University. 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Sean Coleman, Esq., 
Staff Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Department of Natural Resources; 
and Mr. Kerry Kehoe, University of Baltimore School of Law. This article repre-
sents the personal opinions and analyses of the authors and neither those of the 
Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Commission nor the Office of the Attorney General. 
Portions of this article are based upon materials prepared for and delivered in the 
MICPEL Land Use Institute given in Annapolis on December 13, 1985. The au-
thors express their appreciation to MICPEL for granting its permission to use por-
tions of the materials included in this article. 
1. Mo. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1803 to -1806 (Supp. 1986). 
2. /d. § 8-1807. 
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ing and implementing a local program of resource protection in accord-
ance with the Commission's regulations. 3 The programs of each local 
jurisdiction will be subject to review and approval by the Commission. 4 
The regulations, or "criteria," developed by the Commission estab-
lish land use policies in the Critical Area that accommodate growth, con-
trol pollution, and limit the movement and activities of persons in that 
area that may create adverse environmental impacts. The most contro-
versial aspect of the criteria is the regulation that limits development in 
the Resource Conservation Area, one of the three classifications for land 
use around the Bay, to a density of one dwelling unit per twenty acres.5 
One of the legislature's chief concerns in its review of Commission activi-
ties was whether this regulation would so affect private property rights as 
to constitute a taking of that property without just compensation. 
The Commission was established by the General Assembly of Mary-
land to protect the natural resources of the Bay by developing environ-
mental regulations to be followed by local government authorities in the 
creation of their own local critical area programs. Section II of this arti-
cle discusses the creation of the Commission and the development of its 
criteria. In section III, the authors examine the constitutionality of the 
criteria's limit of one dwelling unit per twenty acres. This section ad-
dresses whether this density limit constitutes an unconstitutional "tak-
ing" of the property without just compensation or an unjust deprivation 
of a landowner's property without due process. 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT PROCESS 
It is important to first outline the process and evolution of the law 
which gave rise to the Commission and the Chesapeake Bay Critical 
Area Protection Program. By examining that law in its full contextual 
setting, one can see that the process by which the Critical Areas legisla-
tion was enacted was fair and equitable. 
A. The Critical Area Initiative and the Critical Area 
In 1984, the General Assembly of Maryland passed more than thirty 
bills designed to correct the diverse environmental problems besetting the 
Bay. The Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection Program is but one 
facet of the Legislature's Chesapeake Bay improvement strategy. Thus, 
an understanding of other improvement programs is necessary to place 
the Critical Area Program in perspective. The laws passed in 1984 in-
cluded provisions for upgraded controls of erosion and sedimentation; 
better storm water management; increased funding for better sewage 
treatment plants; more inspectors and prosecutors to enforce industrial 
pollution and hazardous waste laws; implementation of agricultural prac-
3. /d. §§ 8-1801(5), 8-1808(a). 
4. /d. § 8-1808(a). 
5. Mo. REGS. CODE tit. 14, § .15.02.05(c) (1986). [hereinafter COMAR]. 
56 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
tices that will reduce pollution from farms; an increase in environmental 
monitoring and research efforts; an improved ·and expanded program for 
easement acquisition through the Maryland Environmental Trust to help 
save vital habitats; educational initiatives funded by state grants; and re-
source enhancement and restoration actions whereby fin and shell fish 
fisheries are to be improved through hatcheries, vegetation, and plant-
ing. 6 Additionally, on an interstate level, the Legislature authorized an 
intensive effort to cooperate and coordinate closely with the adjacent 
states of Pennsylvania and Virginia, 7 both of which also have instituted 
Bay-related cleanup programs. 8 
In the process of enacting these various bills, the General Assembly 
determined that land uses and activities occurring in a narrow strip of 
land surrounding the Bay and its tributaries could have a significant ef-
fect on the overall quality of the Bay's water and on its varied habitats. 
Thus, it chose to implement a special program to guide land uses and 
activities in this strip of land, which it referred to as the "Critical Area. "9 
B. Purposes and Scope of the Critical Area Program 
The Critical Area Protection Program statute, which became effec-
6. Mo. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8-llA-01 to -08, § 8-1101 to -1108, § 8-1606 (1983 
& Supp. 1986); Mo. AGRIC. CODE ANN.§§ 8-701-705 (1985). In addition to these 
statutory changes, many initiatives only required supplemental funding to existing 
programs; funding requests were made by the Executive Office in the customary 
manner. Other significant bills included new funding programs for the issuance of 
grants, loans and bonds to cover improvements at sewage treatment plants and in-
crease the state's share of such funding. See Mo. HEALTH-ENVTL. ConE ANN. 
§§ 9-203(b), -302, -30l(e), (f), -345, -351 (1982); Mo. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 4-
745 (Supp. 1986). 
7. For Maryland's Tri-state Agreement on the Chesapeake Bay see Mo. NAT. REs. 
CODE ANN. §§ 8-302 to -304 (Supp. 1986). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
enacted the Chesapeake Bay Commission Agreement in June, 1985. See 32 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN.§§ 820.11-.12 (Purdon Supp. 1986). The Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia enacted a similar agreement with Maryland in 1980, amending the legislation 
in 1985 to include Pennsylvania. See VA. CODE ANN.§§ 62.1-69.5 to -69.20 (1982 
& Supp. 1986). 
8. 32 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 820.11-.12 (Purdon Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 62.1-69.5 to -69.20 (1982 & Supp. 1986). 
9. Subtitle 18 of Title 8 of the Natural Resources Article defines the Critical Area as: 
(a) All waters of and lands under the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries 
to the head of tide as indicated on the State wetlands maps, and all 
State and private wetlands and the heads of tides designated under 
Title 9 of the Natural Resources Article, Annotated Code of 
Maryland; 
(b) All lands and water areas within 1,000 feet beyond the landward 
boundaries of State or private wetlands and the heads of tides desig-
nated under Title 9 of the Natural Resources Article, Annotated Code 
of Maryland. 
Mo. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1807(a) (Supp. 1986). The statute described the 
"Critical Area" as the "initial planning area" because local jurisdictions may, 
through the development of their own local programs, propose expansions or exclu-
sions to it. Mo. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1807(b),(c) (Supp. 1986). 
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tive on June 1, 1984,10 includes the General Assembly's declaration of 
public policy and certain findings of fact. The Legislature found that the 
cumulative effects of human activity have deteriorated water quality and 
productivity of the Bay and its tributaries. This activity has caused in-
creased levels of pollutants, nutrients, and toxics in the Bay system, and 
has resulted in the decline of more protective land uses such as forestland 
and agriculture. The Legislature concluded that the restoration of the 
Bay and its tributaries is dependent, in part, upon minimizing further 
adverse impacts to water quality and natural habitats of the shoreline 
and adjacent lands. II 
The General Assembly stated its purposes in enacting the statute: 
( 1) Establish a Resource Protection Program for the Chesa-
peake Bay and its tributaries by fostering more sensitive de-
velopment activity for certain shoreline areas so as to 
minimize damage to water quality and natural habitats; 
and 
(2) Implement the Resource Protection Program on a coopera-
tive basis between the State and affected local governments, 
with local governments establishing and implementing 
their programs in a consistent and uniform manner subject 
to State criteria and oversight. 12 
As this statutory language indicates, local governments are given the 
primary responsibility for developing and implementing the Critical Area 
resource protection programs and must use Commission-developed stan-
dards and criteria to achieve the three protective goals of the law: 
(1) Minimize adverse impacts on water quality that result from 
pollutants that are discharged from structures or convey-
ances or that have run off from surrounding lands; 
(2) Conserve fish, wildlife, and plant habitat; and 
(3) Establish land use policies for development in the Chesa-
peake Bay Critical Area which accommodate growth and 
also address the fact that, even if pollution is controlled, the 
number, movement and activities of persons in that area 
can create adverse environmental impacts. 13 
The Critical Area Program affects sixteen counties and forty-four 
municipalities in the State of Maryland. Each of these local jurisdictions 
is required to submit to the Critical Area Commission for its approval a 
program necessary to achieve the goals identified in the statute. 14 Addi-
10. The Act was adopted as Chapter 794 of the 1984 Md. Laws and codified as Subtitle 
18 of Title 8 of the Natural Resources Article of the Maryland Annotated Code. 
MD. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1801 to -1816 (Supp. 1986). 
11. /d. § 8-1801(a). . 
12. /d. § 8-1801(b). 
13. /d. § 8-1808(b). 
14. /d. § 8-1808. 
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tionally, the Legislature listed eleven minimum elements that each local 
program must include, the most important being new or amended land 
use planning, zoning, and subdivision regulations to protect their critical 
areas. 15 
C. The Critical Area Commission: Creation, Formation and Criteria 
Development 
The Critical Area Commission, created by Chapter 794 of the 1984 
Acts of the Maryland Legislature, consists of twenty-five voting members 
appointed by the Governor. 16 The Commission includes a full-time 
Chairman; 17 eleven individuals, each of whom is a resident and an 
15. The eleven minimum elements listed in the statute are: 
(1) A map designating the critical area in a local jurisdiction; 
(2) A comprehensive zoning map for the critical area; 
(3) As necessary, new or amended provisions of the jurisdiction's: 
(i) Subdivision regulations; 
(ii) Comprehensive or master plan; 
(iii) Zoning ordinances or regulations; 
(iv) Provisions relating to enforcement; and 
(v) Provisions as appropriate relating to grandfathering of develop-
ment at the time the program is adopted or approved by the 
Commission; 
(4) Provisions requiring that project approvals shall be based on findings 
that projects are consistent with the standards stated in subsection 
(b) of this section; 
(5) Provisions to limit the amount of land covered by buildings, roads, 
parking lots, or other impervious surfaces, and to require or en-
courage cluster development, where necessary or appropriate; 
(6) Establishment of buffer areas along shorelines within which agricul-
ture will be permitted only if best management practices are used, 
provided that structures or any other use of land which is necessary 
for adjacent agriculture shall also be permitted in any buffer area; 
(7) Requirements for minimum setbacks for structures and septic fields 
along shorelines; 
(8) Designation of shoreline areas if any that are suitable for parks, hik-
ing, biking, wildlife refuges, scenic drives, public access or assembly, 
and water-related recreation such as boat slips, piers, and beaches; 
(9) Designation of shoreline areas, if any, that are suitable for ports, ma-
rinas, and industries that use water for transportation or derive eco-
nomic benefits from shore access; 
(10) Provisions requiring that all harvesting of timber in the Chesapeake 
Bay Critical Area be in accordance with plans approved by the dis-
trict forestry board; and 
(11) Provisions establishing that the controls in a program which are 
designed to prevent runoff of pollutants will not be required on sites 
where the topography prevents runoff from directly or indirectly 
reaching tidal waters. 
Mo. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1808(c) (Supp. 1986). 
16. Id. § 8-1804(a). 
17. Governor Harry R. Hughes appointed Judge Solomon Liss to be Chairman of the 
Commission. Judge Liss resigned from his position as Associate Judge of the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland to assume the Chairmanship of the Committee in 
October, 1984. 
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elected or appointed official of a local jurisdiction; 18 and eight individuals 
who represent diverse interests, including marinas, fishing, and ecology. 
The Secretaries of Agriculture, Economic and Community Development, 
Health and Mental Hygiene, Natural Resources, and State Planning, or 
their representatives, serve as ex officio members of the Commission. 19 
Except for the Chairman and ex officio state officers, members of the 
Commission serve staggered terms of four years. 20 
The Commission was given all the powers necessary to carry out the 
purposes of the subtitle. These powers include the authority to: ( 1) adopt 
regulatory criteria in accordance with all State administrative proce-
dures; (2) conduct hearings in connection with policies, proposed pro-
grams, and proposed regulations or amendments to regulations; and (3) 
contract for consultant or other services.21 The Commission was em-
powered as an independent agency of the State to enact guidelines which 
local jurisdictions would then be required to follow in developing their 
own local programs. In some ways, this approach is similar to that used 
in other states where state land use commissions control local activities.22 
The Maryland Critical Areas legislation is unique, however, because it 
establishes a joint state/local effort that preserves local zoning and plan-
ning powers that are exercised in accordance with criteria developed by 
the state. 
1. The First Hearings 
The Commission, which began functioning on October 15, 1984, 
was required to promulgate by December 1, 1985, "criteria for program 
development and approval" which were necessary to achieve the pur-
poses of the law.23 The statute mandated that the Commission hold at 
least six regional public hearings in designated areas on the Eastern and 
Western Shores of the Chesapeake Bay before formulating and adopting 
any regulatory criteria. The Commission held seven public hearings, 
each of which was attended by approximately 250 persons.24 Approxi-
mately fifty persons testified at each hearing, expressing their views of 
what should be done to implement the Critical Areas Act. Among those 
testifying were property owners, developers, farmers, marine operators, 
and watermen. The range of these early opinions was wide. Some of 
those testifying feared that the State would interfere unduly with private 
18. The original local jurisdiction representative members included two city council 
presidents, two county executives, two county planning directors, as well as county 
commissioners, council members, and planning commissioners. 
19. Mo. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 8-1804(a)(4) (Supp. 1986). 
20. /d. § 8-1804(c). 
21. /d. § 8-1806. 
22. See Shoreline Management Act of 1971, WASH. REv. CODE §§ 90.58.010-.930 
(1985); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-.855 (1985). 
23. Mo. NAT. REs. CODE ANN.§ 8-1808(d) (Supp. 1986). 
24. The early hearings were held in December, 1984, and January, 1985, in Easton, 
Elkton, Prince Frederick, Salisbury, Crofton, Centreville, and Essex, Maryland. 
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property rights. Others emphasized environmental concerns and offered 
detailed recommendations for specific criteria to control development 
and decrease pollution from both industrial and agricultural sources. 
The testimony of the witnesses at the public hearings revealed that there 
was unanimous support of a save-the-Bay effort, but that there was a 
divergence of opinion as to the causes of the environmental problems 
besetting the Bay, as well as what remedial measures should be imple-
mented. Although many witnesses admitted some fault on their part, 
others merely placed the blame elsewhere. All interest groups professed 
a love of the Bay, but none was anxious to assume the cost of restoration. 
2. The Early Months 
The Commission sought the expertise of individuals who had been 
engaged in similar planning and resource management programs. For 
this purpose, a two-day seminar25 was held where presentations were 
given to the Commission and its staff by various environmental experts. 26 
The distinguished speakers furnished the Commission with a crash 
course in the basic problems the Commission would face in the develop-
ment of its criteria, and offered suggestions drawn from their own exper-
iences with similar resource conservation programs. 
The Commission divided its membership into three subcommittees: 
(1) resource-based activities subcommittee, dealing principally with sur-
face mining, forestry, agriculture, and fisheries; (2) the land development 
subcommittee; and (3) resource enhancement and management subcom-
mittee, which included consideration of habitat protection, establishment 
of buffer areas, protection of threatened and endangered species, and the 
protection of anadromous fish habitat. These subcommittees began a se-
ries of weekly meetings where individuals with knowledge and experience 
in the respective areas briefed the committee members. The meetings 
were open to the public and representatives of a number of industries 
such as forestry, residential development, fisheries, and marinas, ap-
peared and offered their suggestions. In addition, several environmental 
organizations interested in the Chesapeake Bay attended the meetings of 
the subcommittees and offered their recommendations. The committees 
also heard from local planners and government advisory groups. 
During this intense study period the Commission's staff conducted 
in-depth research and analysis on such varied topics as existing land uses 
around the Bay, pollution loadings and inputs, best management prac-
25. The seminar was held at the Tidewater Inn in Easton, Maryland on January 24 and 
25, 1985. 
26. The environmental experts included Michael Mantell, representing the Conserva-
tion Foundation; Terry Moore, Executive Director of the Pinelands Commission of 
New Jersey; Joseph Petrillo, then Executive Director of the California Coastal Con-
servancy; David Owens, Director of Coastal Management for the State of North 
Carolina; and Dr. John Kusler, Director of the Association of Wetlands Managers 
of New England and a widely published legal scholar on conservation and environ-
mental protection. 
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tices for dealing with non-point source pollution from farms and urban 
areas, habitat needs, current land use planning and controls being used 
around the Bay, and state-level resource protection/restoration programs 
from around the country. 
3. Hearings: Round Two 
After six months of study, consideration, and debate, each of the 
three subcommittees presented drafts of regulatory criteria to the full 
Commission in April and May of 1985. The Commission reviewed these 
drafts and then issued its first draft of the· proposed regulations. This 
draft was printed in the Maryland Register 27 with a schedule of six more 
public hearings to be held on the Eastern and Western Shores of the Bay 
during late June and July, 1985.28 Attendance at this series of hearings 
was even greater than at the earlier hearings. Approximately seventy-five 
persons registered to speak at each hearing. Transcripts of all testimony 
given at these hearings were furnished to the subcommittees and to the 
staff for further research. 
After several weeks of redrafting and refining, the subcommittees 
and the staff submitted a revised set of proposed criteria to the Commis-
sion. The Commission debated the proposed changes over a three-day 
period and then adopted the revised regulatory criteria in August of 
1985. The Commission furnished copies of these criteria to the Legisla-
tive Oversight Committee.29 The Oversight Committee held two full-
scale hearings and suggested several modifications and language clarifica-
tions to which the Critical Areas Commission agreed.30 
Once revised by the Commission, the proposed criteria were then 
sent to the Administrative, Executive, and Legislative Review (AELR) 
Committee for its review, in accordance with Maryland law on adminis-
trative regulations. 31 The AELR Committee approved the publication of 
the regulations for public review and comment. 32 During this period a 
27. 12:12 Md. Reg. 1188-1206 (June 7, 1985). 
28. Initially, six hearings were advertised and held. Three additional hearings were ad-
vertised and held at the request of several legislators. These hearings were held in 
June and July, 1985, in Havre de Grace, Waldorf, Chestertown, Easton, Salisbury, 
Annapolis, Leonardtown, and Essex, Maryland. 
29. This committee, consisting of five state senators and five state delegates, was estab- · 
lished by the General Assembly to meet periodically with the Critical Areas Com-
mission to review the development of the Critical Areas regulatory criteria. Mo. 
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1808(d)(2) (Supp. 1986). This Legislative Oversight 
Committee was another unique feature of the Critical Areas regulation development 
process. It allowed for an ongoing discussion between the Critical Areas Commis-
sion and the legislature at every stage of the criteria development. 
30. The Commission agreed that certain clarifications in various clauses would be use-
ful, particularly in the "grandfathering" clauses, and instructed the staff to prepare 
the necessary clarifying language. For a discussion of "grandfathering" clauses in 
the criteria, see infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
31. Mo. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN.§§ 10-110 to -117 and§§ 2-501 to -507 (1984 & 
Supp. 1985). 
32. 12:20 Md. Reg. 1953-1977 (September 27, 1985). 
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number of written and oral communications were received and duly re-
ported to the AELR Committee. The criteria, with changes, finally were 
adopted by the Critical Areas Commission and were published in the 
Maryland Register on November 22, 1985.33 The Commission thus met 
the December 1, 1985 deadline set a year and a half earlier by the Legis-
lature.34 During the next four months, however, the regulations faced an 
arduous test in the Legislature and were the subject of intensive commen-
tary from opponents and proponents alike. 
D. The Critical Areas Criteria 
The criteria as adopted by the Commission and approved by the 
Legislature address the following subjects: land development, water-de-
pendent facilities, shore erosion protection, forestry, agriculture, surface 
mining, shoreline buffers, and fish, plant and wildlife habitat. 35 
The criteria are intended to accommodate growth, while also pro-
viding for the conservation of habitat and the protection of water quality 
in the critical area. The policies that local jurisdictions must follow in-
clude: limitation of development activities in buffer areas to those that 
are water-dependent; encouragement of protection by landowners of the 
rapidly eroding shoreline; conservation of forests and woodland and pro-
vision for expansion of forested areas; assurance that agricultural lands 
are maintained in agricultural use, to the extent possible, and assurance 
that the creation of new agricultural lands is not accomplished if it will 
affect adversely water quality or destroy plant and wildlife habitat; pro-
tection of the Critical Area from all sources of pollution from surface 
mining operations; encouragement of recreational use of natural environ-
ments without destruction to the natural habitats by establishment of 
natural parks; protection of the wetlands and shorelines in the Critical 
Area; protection of species in need of conservation and threatened and 
endangered species, and their habitats in the Critical Area; and protec-
tion offish propagation waters, wildlife habitat, and plant communities.36 
The criteria comprise over sixty pages of regulations and set forth 
directives that local jurisdictions must follow in developing their local 
criteria programs. 37 These directives, in conjunction with the statutory 
guidelines for local program approval and adoption, 38 outline the process 
by which local governments must develop critical areas programs. 
33. 12:24 Md. Reg. 2352-2354 (November 22, 1985). 
34. Mo. NAT. REs. CoDE ANN. § 8-1808(d) (Supp. 1986). 
35. COMAR, supra note 5, §§ .15.02-.15.09. 
36. /d. Each chapter in the regulations governs a separate aspect of the environment 
that the criteria are intended to affect. Each chapter sets forth policies which local 
jurisdictions shall follow when addressing each specific aspect of the environment. 
See, e.g., COMAR, supra note 5, §§ .15.03.02, .15.04.02, and .15.05.02. 
37. /d.§§ .15.10- .15.11. 
38. /d.; Mo. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1809 to -1815 (Supp. 1986). 
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E Proceeding Through the General Assembly 
The original enactment of the Critical Areas program required that 
the Commission promulgate by regulation criteria to assist the local sub-
divisions in preparing their own local programs. The law also required 
that these criteria be submitted to the General Assembly in its 1986 ses-
sion for approval or rejection by means of a joint resolution of the two 
houses of the Legislature. 39 No amendment to the criteria was to be al-
lowed; the criteria were to be approved or rejected in toto. 40 
The criteria as presented to the Legislature provoked heated debate 
between supporters and detractors. Many senators and delegates from 
the Eastern Shore supported the opposition of home builders and realtors 
contending that the criteria would reduce the tax base of the Eastern 
Shore counties and thereby hamper efforts to develop a desired infra-
structure in those counties. The most strenuously opposed portion of the 
proposed criteria was the regulatory provision which stated that develop-
ment in the Resource Conservation Area41 was permissible under certain 
circumstances42 but at a density of not more than one dwelling unit per 
twenty acres. 
Several members of the Legislature in both the Senate and the 
House of Delegates, consisting principally of representatives of the East-
em Shore, introduced thirty-five bills which, if adopted, would have al-
tered fundamentally the criteria as proposed. Consultation between the 
Governor's representatives and the representatives of those who sought 
relief from the provisions of the criteria began and extended over a period 
of more than two months. Many of the proposed bills designed to mod-
39. Section 3 of 1985 Md. Laws 794 provides that the criteria promulgated by the Com-
mission may not be implemented unless the General Assembly at the 1986 Session 
affirms by joint resolution that the criteria are reasonable and acceptable to accom-
plish the goals of Subtitle 18. Mo. NAT. RES. CoDE ANN. § 8-1801 (Supp. 1986). 
The executive branch caused the introduction of House Joint Resolution No. 17 and 
Senate Joint Resolution No. 9, and each concluded that the Commission had com-
plied with the provisions of the act and that the criteria should be affirmed. The 
resolutions were assigned to the Economic and Environmental Affairs Committee of 
the State Senate and the Environmental Matters Committee of the House of Dele-
gates. After several hearings, the resolutions were approved by both Committees by 
substantial majorities. 
40. The General Assembly affirmed that the criteria promulgated are reasonable and 
acceptable in Joint Resolutions 36 and 37, enacted May 13, 1986. Mo. NAT. RES. 
CODE ANN. § 8-1801 (Supp. 1986). Section 3, chapter 794 of the Acts of 1984 
provided a mechanism for dealing with the General Assembly's potential disaffec-
tion with the regulations: a requirement that the regulations be revised by the Com-
mission and resubmitted in 1987, which would delay their effective date to June 1, 
1987. The General Assembly could also enact separate legislation outside the joint 
resolution process. Given this mechanism, it was the opinion of counsel for the 
General Assembly, as well as that of counsel for the Commission, that the joint 
resolution itself could not selectively alter or approve portions of the regulations. 
41. COMAR, supra note 5, § .15.02.05 defines Resource Conservation Area as those ar-
eas characterized by nature-dominated environments and resource-utilization activi-
ties. COMAR, supra note 5, § .15.02.05. 
42. /d. § 15.02.05(C)(4). 
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ify the criteria were defeated in either the Senate or House Committees. 43 
Negotiations continued on several other proposed bills, some of which 
ultimately were adopted by the Legislature.44 The Legislature then ap-
proved the joint resolutions and the Critical Areas criteria went into full 
force and effect on May 13, 1986.45 One ofthe most significant modifica-
43. Those bills that were defeated in either the Senate or House Committees are summa-
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Defeated in Senate 
Committee 
Defeated in Senate 
Committee 
Defeated in Senate 
Committee 
Defeated in Committee 
Withdrawn by Sponsor 
44. The General Assembly passed five bills: (1) Senate Bill 528 and House Bill 1345, 
which increased the quorum requirement for Commission panels holding local hear-
ings on the adoption of local programs; (2) Senate Bill 593 and House Bill 1434, 
which amended the growth allotment of Intensely Developed Areas and permitted 
the counting of wetlands in determining the density in Resource Conservation Ar-
eas; (3) House Bill 1513, which authorized counties and municipalities to adopt 
Transferable Development Rights programs; (4) House Bill 1495, which authorized 
and regulated intrafamily transfers; and (5) House Bill 1496, which governed maxi-
mum lot coverage as amended, and made the criteria slightly less restrictive. 
45. Upon the signing of the necessary certification of approval by the President of the 
State Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates, the Critical Areas criteria 
went into effect. The Legislature approved Joint Resolutions Numbers 36 (HJ17) 
and 37 (SJ9). 
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tions in the statute was a change in the density limitation for Resource 
Conservation Areas. The criteria as adopted by the Legislature limited 
development to one dwelling unit per twenty acres as intended by the 
Commission.46 A statutory change, however, provided some flexibility 
for landowners along the wetlands to use the wetland acreage in arriving 
at a density figure of up to one dwelling unit per eight acres.47 Although 
the modifying bills may weaken, to some extent, the criteria as originally 
proposed, the Commission has determined that the overall effect does not 
threaten materially the ability of the Commission to work with local ju-
risdictions to achieve the purposes which the local programs were in-
tended to achieve. · 
F. Adoption of Critical Areas Programs by Local Authorities 
Section 8-1809 of the Critical Areas legislation outlines the proce-
dures local governments must follow in order to have their critical areas 
programs approved and adopted by the Commission. Under this provi-
sion, local jurisdictions were required to submit to the Commission writ-
ten statements of their intention to develop or not develop the local 
programs within forty-five days after the criteria became effective.48 If a 
jurisdiction decided not to develop a local program, or failed to meet the 
forty-five day deadline, the Commission was required to prepare a local 
program for it. 49 
Local jurisdictions were then given 270 days to prepare and submit 
their programs to the Commission, but upon satisfactory evidence of rea-
sonable progress, an additional 180 days was to be accorded by the Com-
mission. 50 Within this time and before submission, the local jurisdiction 
had to hold at least one public hearing on its proposed program, with due 
advance notice to the public.51 Within thirty days after the program's 
submission, a Commission panel of five members52 was to hold another 
public hearing on the proposed program in the affected jurisdiction. 
The Commission had ninety days after receipt of a local program to 
approve it or notify the local jurisdiction of necessary changes before ap-
proval could be granted. ..No action" is equivalent to approval. All nec-
essary changes must have been made by local jurisdictions within forty 
days of the Commission's notice of the specific changes that must be 
46. Co MAR, supra note 5, § .15.02.05(C)( 4). The earliest draft of the criteria contained 
a density limitation for Resource Conservation Areas of one dwelling unit per fifty 
acres. The Commission changed this to one dwelling unit per twenty acres prior to 
proposing the regulations. 
47. Mo. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 8-1808.l(c). 
48. Jd. § 8-1809(a). 
49. Jd. § 8-1809(b). 
50. Jd. § 8-1809(c). 
51. /d. 
52. Pursuant to the newly enacted House Bill 1345 and Senate Bill 528, the former three 
member panel requirement is now five. See supra note 44. 
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made. 53 
Within ninety days of Commission approval of the local program, 
the local jurisdiction was to hold hearings and adopt the program in ac-
cordance with its procedures for enacting ordinances. The local jurisdic-
tion's governing body may have proposed further changes, and these 
must have been acted upon by the Commission within thirty days. 
The Critical Areas statute provides that within two years and one 
month (760 days) after the Commission's criteria became effective, 
"there shall be in effect throughout the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area 
programs approved or adopted by the Commission. " 54 Then, at least 
once every four years, local jurisdictions are to review their programs 
and may propose amendments to them for Commission approval. 55 
G. Conclusion: The Legislative Enactment Process 
The creation of the Critical Area Commission's regulations has been 
a time consuming and involved process. The process included innumera-
ble meetings; sixteen public hearings; the concerned testimony of hun-
dreds of Bay-area citizens; commentary from a score of trade and 
environmental interest groups; exchanges of ideas between legislators, 
the Governor's staff and the Commission and its staff; and television, 
radio, and newspaper coverage. The Critical Areas legislation reflects 
the general consensus of environmental experts and the state legislature. 
One of the Legislature's chief concerns, as noted previously, was whether 
the regulations requiring a maximum of one dwelling unit per twenty 
acres in specified areas would so affect private property rights as to con-
stitute a taking of that property without just compensation. The remain-
ing portion of this article examines whether the regulation violates a 
property owner's due process rights or constitutes a taking without just 
compensation. 
III. THE EFFECT ON PRIVATE PROPERTY INTERESTS 
Law review articles on land use control "takings" are legion because 
after nearly a hundred years of case decisions and intensive scholarship, 
the law on the takings question is still rather unsettled. Although vari-
ous "rules" have been applied by the courts, disagreement continues on 
the fundamental question of what constitutes a taking. Often, the judicial 
determination of a taking is rendered on a "I-know-it-when-I-see-it" ba-
sis. This approach is appropriate given the traditional ad hoc analysis of 
takings issues. 56 
53. Mo. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1809(d)(3) (Supp. 1986). 
54. /d. § 8-1809(f). 
55. /d. § 8-1809(g). 
56. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). In 
Connelly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1018, 1025 (1986), the United 
States Supreme Court articulated that although it would need to look at the facts of 
each regulatory takings case on an ad hoc basis, three factors would be important in 
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This section of the article will not review the history of takings law. 
Nor will it discuss compensation as a possible remedy to a taking, a sub-
ject sufficiently treated elsewhere.57 Rather, it discusses whether the 
Critical Areas regulation limiting density to one dwelling unit per twenty 
acres in that portion of a local jurisdiction's Critical Area known as the 
Resource Conservation Area, or "RCA," constitutes a "taking." 
A. RCAs in The Critical Area Criteria 
Under the Critical Area law, as described in section II of this article, 
the Commission was empowered to set standards and guidelines that 
would help achieve the statute's goals and deal positively with the Gen-
eral Assembly's findings. Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the 
Critical Areas regulatory strategy is the process whereby each local juris-
diction must classify all of its land within its critical area into three cate-
gories based largely on existing land use characteristics: "Intensely 
Developed Areas" (IDAs), which generally may be characterized as ur-
banized settings; "Limited Development Areas" (LDAs), which encom-
pass areas of more moderate development and less intensive land uses; 
and "Resource Conservation Areas" (RCAs), areas of very limited devel-
opment where natural resources or resource utilization activities, such as 
farming and forestry, predominate.58 
The amount of further development, the types of other activities 
permitted in the Critical Area, and the extent of control over those activ-
ities, generally follow from this initial classification. 59 The Critical Areas 
statute itself directs that each local jurisdiction shall categorize broadly 
its Critical Area so that various protections could be offered to different 
land uses. 60 Other states previously had adopted similar schemes in their 
regional resource protection programs and land planning practices.61 
its analysis: economic impact on the applicant; the extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and the overall charac-
ter of the government action. For examples of judicial analysis of the takings ques-
tion, see infra note 99. 
57. For an interesting discussion of compensation as a possible remedy to governmental 
taking, see Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation, and the Fifth 
Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 
RUTGERS L.J. 15 (1983); Freilich, Solving the Takings Equation: Making the Whole 
Equal the Sum of its Parts, 15 URB. LAW 447 (1983); Williams, The White River 
Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. I (1984); Note, Takings Law- Is Inverse Con-
demnation an Appropriate Remedy for Due Process Violations?, 51 WASH. L. REv. 
551 (1982). 
58. COMAR, supra note 5, § .15.02. 
59. /d.§§ .15.02-.15.09. 
60. Section 8-1801 provides that declines in more protective land uses, such as forest 
and agricultural land, have contributed to Bay degradation. Mo. NAT. REs. CODE 
ANN. § 8-1801(a)(4) (Supp. 1986). 
61. See Pinelands Commission, State of New Jersey, Comprehensive Management Plan 
for the Pinelands National Reserve (National Parks and Recreation Act, 1979) and 
Pinelands Area (New Jersey Pinelands Protection Act, 1979 (1980)) [hereinafter 
Pinelands Plan]. 
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Additionally, the Commission staff found evidence that linked low den-
sity land use to higher water quality and to preservation of terrestrial and 
aquatic habitats.62 Accordingly, the Commission chose to adopt as one 
of its measures for conservation the "one per twenty" density limitation 
in the most resource-valuable of the three areas, the RCA. The Commis-
sion reasoned that such a limitation was required because of the pressure 
to convert the land to more urbanized or developed uses which would 
affect adversely the environment, particularly by disturbing upland 
habitat and impeding the natural ability of the land to handle runoff. 63 
Under the "one per twenty" plan, development generally would be di-
rected to areas where sewer systems - soon to be upgraded around the 
Bay - could help treat water quality problems. 64 Despite the compel-
ling environmental interests at the basis of the "one per twenty" regula-
tion, that regulation was the most intensely debated criteria among the 
public, in the Legislature, and within the Commission itself because of its 
impact on private property interests. 65 
B. Due Process and Takings 
The takings clauses of the United States and Maryland Constitu-
tions are similar, though not identical.66 Their effect is the same: the 
state may not deprive a person of his property without due process of 
law, nor may private property be taken for public use without just com-
pensation.67 In judicial interpretations and scholarly articles over the 
62. See, e.g., Lynch & Whigham, Configuration of Forest Patches Necessary to Maintain 
Bird and Plant Communities, PPRP-59, Maryland Power Plant Research Program 
(1982); National Agricultural Lands Study, The Protection of Farmland, U.S.D.A. 
(1981). 
63. See COMAR, supra notes, § .15.02.05. Farmland, which also had been identified as a 
source of non-point source pollution would, under other Commission regulations, 
be forced to utilize "Best Management Practices" to control the problem; forested 
areas, of course, would not require additional or artificial techniques. ld. 
§ .15.05.06. Non-point source pollution refers to water pollution that has no dis-
crete point of entry to the water. Runoff from a suburban lawn might enter a 
stream as non-point source pollution, for example, whereas discharge from an in-
dustrial plant usually enters via a pipe or conduit, or point source. 
64. Chesapeake Bay Critical Areas Commission, Rationale for 20 Acre Density Re-
quirement in Resource Conservation Areas of the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area 
(September, 1985) (unpublished paper). 
65. The "one per twenty" criterion was itself a compromise. Early drafts contained 
"one per fifty" language. See supra note 46. 
66. U.S. CONST. amends. V, § 4, XIV,§ 1; MD. CONST. art. 24, Declaration of Rights, 
art. III, § 40. 
67. Compare the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution: 
... [N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V; and section 1 of the fourteenth amendment: 
... [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; ... 
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1, with article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights, which provides: 
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years, these two clauses have been merged, separated, merged again, and 
distinguished so as to produce considerable bewilderment. Additional 
confusion on what constitutes a taking was generated by the opinion of 
the United States Supreme Court in the early case of Pennsylvania Coal 
Company v. Mahon.68 In that case, Justice Holmes, writing for the 
Court, stated "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing. " 69 What constitutes "too far" continues to be a subject of specula-
tion and controversy. 
The due process and the takings clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment traditionally have been interpreted differently. The due process 
clause historically has been considered to be a limit on the police power 
of the state and the takings clause has been interpreted to limit one aspect 
of that police power, the power of the state to resort to eminent domain. 
Owing to this distinction, modem courts have afforded differing remedies 
for violations of the due process and takings clauses: invalidation of the 
regulation under the due process clause and just compensation under the 
takings clause. 70 
The first prong of the traditional test to determine whether a govern-
ment regulation that affects private property rights violates the due pro-
cess clause is whether the government action is rationally based and 
reasonably constructed.?' The due process requirements seem to have 
been satisfied by the Commission in its promulgation of the "one per 
twenty" regulation. The regulation cannot be said to have been enacted 
arbitrarily and capriciously, given the level of attention and detail with 
which the "one per twenty" criterion was studied, the open, public de-
bate to which it was subjected, and the rationale upon which it was 
based. Although some may not agree that the "one per twenty" regula-
tion constitues good policy, it was only promulgated after ample deliber-
ation and consideration of competing interests.72 Further, the 
Commission's regulation is but a first step in the regulatory process. The 
That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, 
liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, 
or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his 
peers, or by the Law of the land. 
Mo. CONST. art. 24, Declaration of Rights; and section 40 of article III of the 
Maryland Constitution, which provides: 
The General Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property, to 
be ta.l<en for public use, without just compensation, as agreed upon be-
tween the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the 
party entitled to such compensation. 
Mo. CONST. art. Ill, § 40. 
68. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1915). 
69. /d. at 415. 
70. See Note, New Jersey Pinelands Plan and the Taking Question, 7 COLUM. J. OF 
ENVTL. L. 227, 231 n.31 (1982). 
71. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 
Md. 355,228 A.2d 450 (1967); Board of County Comm'rs v. Farr, 242 Md. 315,218 
A.2d 923 (1966); Elliott v. Joyce, 233 Md. 76, 195 A.2d 254 (1963). 
72. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text. 
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local jurisdictions still must propose, gain approval of, and enact their 
own critical area programs. Thus, the local procedures for employing 
critical area criteria are further safeguards to due process rights. It is 
only then that the impact of the local regulation upon a particular prop-
erty owner can be assessed. 
A closer question, considered in the second prong of the test of con-
stitutionality, is whether the "one per twenty" regulation violates private 
rights protected under the takings, rather than the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment. The traditional standard for whether there 
has been a government taking, is whether the property owner is left with 
a "reasonable use" after the government action. 73 According to both 
early and recent Supreme Court opinions, reasonable use does not mean 
"highest and best use," nor the most or even the significantly more profit-
able use. 74 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that the 
regulation in question must preclude all reasonable or beneficial uses of 
the property before a taking can be found. 75 Thus, lawfully enacted re-
strictions upon some of the "bundle of rights" which are said to charac-
terize property ownership will not imply, necessarily, a taking. Where 
too many of that bundle of rights are destroyed, however, a taking may 
be found. 76 
C. How Much is Too Much? 
In zoning takings cases, the determination of whether there has been 
a taking often turns on considerations of degree. Thus, quantitative eval-
uations of when a large lot is too large, when a low density requirement is 
too low, and when a diminution in property value caused by a govern-
ment action is too great are frequently dispositive of whether a taking has 
occurred. Courts do not, and cannot, however, measure these variables 
with precise formulas. The type of quantitative determinations just men-
tioned are only part of the total consideration by the court. Also of pri-
mary importance is whether the land use regulation is justified under, 
and within the scope of, the protection of public health, safety and gen-
eral welfare. Courts also must balance the degree of private burden 
which the government action causes with the prevention of public harm. 
Finally, courts traditionally have afforded a significant degree of defer-
73. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-62 (1980); Deltona Corp. v. United 
States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); A verne Bay 
Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). 
74. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. 
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
75. Mayor of Rockville v. Stone, 271 Md. 655, 311 A.2d 536 (1974); Arnold v. Prince 
George's County, 270 Md. 285, 311 A.2d 223 (1973); Kent Island Joint Venture v. 
Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1978). See also Baltimore City v. Borinsky, 239 
Md. 611, 622, 212 A.2d 508, 5l4 (1965) (clarifying that "the restrictions imposed 
must be such that the property cannot be used for any reasonable purpose. It is not 
enough ... to show that the zoning action results in substantial loss or hardship."). 
76. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 
226 u.s. 137 (1912). 
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ence to the elected or appointed officials who have mandated the govern-
ment action in question. 77 
1. Lot size limitations 
Large lot and low density zoning cases have a varied history. Ever 
since National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn 78 and its Pennsylvania 
progeny in the late 1960's, 79 many courts have cast a wary eye on zoning 
ordinances which provide for districts in which the average or minimum 
lot sizes are high or in which the overall densities are low. Courts have 
held that it is impermissible to create low density zones for exclusionary 
purposes or, as stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, to "keep 
out people [and] refuse to confront the future."8° Courts have invali-
dated low density zoning provisions where there was a lack of evidence 
for the basis of the large lot scheme, 81 the purpose or primary effect of 
the scheme was exclusionary,82 the zoning mechanism appeared to be 
arbitrary, 83 or where it appeared that the sole purpose of the ordinance 
was to preserve open space and rural character. 84 Where, however, there 
77. The courts, it is said, must not "substitute their judgment" for that of the deci-
sionmakers; the first presumption is that the laws or regulations were lawfully en-
acted and are valid. County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 364, 268 A.2d 450, 
454 (1967); Montgomery County v. Fields Road, 282 Md. 575, 583, 386 A.2d 344, 
349 (1978). 
78. National Land & lnv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). 
79. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Appeal of 
Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). 
80. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). 
81. Kasparek v. Johnson County Bd. of Health, 288 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1980) (one 
dwelling per five acres held unreasonable in light of no evidence of purported water 
quality basis, and economic impact to owner who had already expended large sums 
to develop); National Land & lnv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) 
(one dwelling per four acres held confiscatory because no evidence of possible on-
site septic problems); Martin v. Township of Mill Creek, 50 Pa. Cornrow. 249, 413 
A.2d 764 (1980) (one dwelling per ten acres held unreasonable to protect watershed 
against pollution by on-site septic systems); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 
Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) (three acre lot held unreasonable as unnecessary to 
support on-site sewerage system). 
82. Christ United Methodist Church v. Municipality of Bethel Park, 58 Pa. Cornrow. 
610, 428 A.2d 745 (1981) (five acres requirement for institutional houses held pri-
marily exclusionary); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 
S.E.2d 390 (1959) (two acres minimum held unreasonable, arbitrary, and exclusion-
ary in effect); Grand Land Co. v. Township of Bethlehem, 196 N.J. Super. 547,483 
A.2d 818 (1984) (twenty-five acres for every one and one-half acre building lot held 
invalid and exclusionary). 
83. Hopewell Township Bd. of Supervisors v. Golla, 499 Pa. 246, 452 A.2d 1337 (1982) 
(development in farmland area, restricted to five one and one-half acre plots per 
tract, regardless of size of tract, held arbitrary and unreasonable); Appeal of Buck-
ingham Developers, Inc., 61 Pa. Cornrow. 408,433 A.2d 931 (1981) (subdivision in 
farmland limited to five single family homes per tract, regardless of size of tract, 
held unreasonable per Golla opinion, although no taking because owner could still 
get reasonable housing yield). 
84. Kavenensky v.Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 160 Conn. 597, 279 A.2d 567 (1971) (one 
unit per two acres held solely to keep community rural and in open space and thus 
unlawful under zoning purposes of enabling statute); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 
72 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
is a fairly wide range of other density zones in the community, and the 
intention is to achieve other legitimate objectives or deal positively with 
exigent circumstances, courts are more circumspect concerning the local 
actions they will review, much less overturn, for constitutional infir-
mity.85 Low density zoning regularly has been upheld across the country 
when, in addition to the other takings analysis factors mentioned previ-
ously, it is rationally based, reasonably formulated, and accomplishes, 
among other justifiable ends, such objectives as environmental protec-
tion, resource conservation, and agricultural preservation. 86 Maryland 
cases reflect this strong trend. 87 
57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976) (one unit per ten acres requirement 
held a taking because only done to preserve open space). 
85. Among those objectives or circumstances likely to be considered favorably are 
maintaining water quality in surface and groundwaters, providing for the conserva-
tion of wetlands, preserving agricultural lands, or providing for a mix, adequate 
siting, and the compatibility of land uses and characteristics, including open space. 
86. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (five acre zoning district not an un-
reasonable method of, inter alia, providing for open space, growth management and 
rural character); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanborton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 
1972) (minimum lot sizes of three and six acres upheld on soils and water pollution 
bases); Wermayer v. Cormorant Township Bd., 716 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1983) (one 
unit per five acres requirement upheld in area around lake); Gisler v. County of 
Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974) (one per 18 acre require-
ment in agricultural zoning held not a taking); Napro Corp. v. Town of Cherry Hills 
Village, 181 Colo. 217, 504 P.2d 344 (1972) (two and one-half acre minimum lot 
size requirement for residential use held reasonable); Zygmont v. Planning and Zon-
ing Comm'n ofTown of Greenwich, 152 Conn. 550,210 A.2d 172 (1965) (no taking 
in one residence per four acre district where basis was nature of land); Moviematic 
Indus. Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667 (Fla. App. 1977) (one 
dwelling per five acres zoning upheld for water quality reasons); County of Ada v. 
Henry, 105 Idaho 263, 668 P.2d 994 (1983) (80 acres minimum lot size in certain 
zones upheld against takings challenge); Wilson v. County of McHenry, 92 Ill. App. 
3d 997, 416 N.E.2d 426 (1981) (160 acres minimum lot size in agricultural zone 
upheld as applied); Wilson v. Town of Sherborn, 3 Mass. App. 237,326 N.E.2d 922 
(1985) (two acre minimum lot size restriction upheld on soil condition basis); D & R 
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Green County, 630 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. App. 1982) (one dwell-
ing per ten acres not a taking in area around reservoir to protect water quality 
therein); Salamar Builders v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275 N.E.2d 585, 325 N.Y.S.2d 
933 (1971) (no taking in one unit per one and one-half acre zoning district because 
protection against well pollution was held to be an adequate reason for a density 
requirement); Boundary Drive Assocs. v. Shrewsbury Township, 507 Pa. 487, 491 
A.2d 86 (1985) (sliding scale restrictions upheld for agricultural land preservation 
purposes); Kelly v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 87 Pa. Commw. 534, 487 A.2d 1043 (1985) 
(restriction of one residence per three acres upheld); Codurus Township v. Rodgers, 
89 Pa. Commw. 79, 492 A.2d 73 (1985) (50 acre remainder requirement upheld in 
sliding scale farmland preservation scheme); Caste v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 70 Pa. 
Commw. 368, 453 A.2d 69 (1982) (10 acre minimum lot size for apartments held 
reasonable regulation); DeCaro v. Washington Township, Berks County, 21 Pa. 
Commw. 252, 344 A.2d 725 (1975) (three acre density upheld on evidence of unsuit-
ability for septic disposal systems); Aldre Properties, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 
Chancery Nos. 78463-A, 78476, 78450, 78425, letter op. (19th Cir. Va. Jan. 7, 1985) 
(five acre zoning not unreasonably related to water quality protection and other 
matters) .. 
87. Norbeck Village Joint Venture, Inc. v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 
254 A.2d 700 (1969) (downzoning of 50 square miles held lawful exercise of police 
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Very low density zoning has been accomplished widely and lawfully 
both across the country and in Maryland. In Maryland three counties 
already have adopted zoning densities similar to or lower than the one 
unit per twenty acre requirement of the Critical Area's RCA.88 For agri-
cultural land conservation purposes, scores of communities nationwide 
have adopted low density and sliding scale zoning schemes ranging from 
ten acre to 640 acre minimums.89 Local and regional zoning plans that 
evolved out of the New Jersey Pinelands Commission study have created 
districts in that region where eighteen acres is required per dwelling unit 
and, in one township, where a seventy acre minimum now is found.90 
Against this background of what constitutes constitutional land use 
control, the Commission's "one per twenty" density regulation in RCAs 
does not appear to be an unconstitutional taking. The regulation is ra-
tionally based, reasonably formulated and accomplishes numerous justifi-
able ends, including environmental protection, resource conservation, 
and agricultural preservation. Here it would appear that the large lot 
requirements are probably not unconstitutionally too large. 
2. Diminution in value 
Just as there is no mechanical formula by which a court can deter-
mine when a low density zone is too low, there is no precise method of 
determining when a diminution of private property values by means of 
government regulation is so great as to constitute a taking.91 As with 
density determinations, case law reveals a wide range of judicial opinion, 
and the matter of pre- and post-petition regulation value is but one of 
many factors considered in the takings analysis. 
In one recent case, the court affirmed as valid an action which re-
power); County Comm'rs. v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967); DuFour v. 
Montgomery County Council, Law Nos. 56964, 56968, 56969, 56970, 56983, un-
published op. (January 20, 1983) (downzoning of 88,000 acres [137 square miles] to 
one unit per twenty-five acres requirement upheld in face of takings challenge); 
Klein v. Anne Arundel County, Equity No. 3102157, letter op. (August 3, 1982) 
(95,000 acre [150 square miles] downzoning to one unit per twenty acres for farm-
land preservation, environmental protection, and growth management purposes up-
held as no taking). 
88. Maryland counties that have adopted zoning densities similar to the one unit per 
twenty acres requirement are Anne Arundel, Carroll, Montgomery. See ANNE AR-
UNDEL COUNTY, Mo., CoDE art. 28, § 2-211 (Supp. 1986), § 2-608 (Feb. 23, 1987); 
CARROLL COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCES § 6.6 (1986); MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCES§ 5, art. 59-C-9.41 (Supp. 1985). 
89. R. COUGHLIN & J. KEENE ET AL., NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, 
"Protection of Farmland" Guidebook 112 (1980). 
90. These densities were reported in a telephone interview with William Harrison (April 
9, 1986). 
91. The question of value diminution is complicated further because, as noted, the de-
crease in property value is but one factor in the overall determination of whether 
there has been a taking. 
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suited in perhaps a ninety-five percent reduction in value.92 In an older 
case, an eighty-seven percent reduction in value was permitted. 93 In 
1975 a California court upheld a rezoning where the land value dimin-
ished by about seventy-seven percent.94 In more recent cases courts have 
upheld the local action where the differences in value were between sixty 
and eighty-five percent.95 The rationale for upholding ordinances even 
where they result in significant decreases of property value was provided 
by the Supreme Court of California in HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of 
Lo~ Angeles County:96 
Plaintiffs fail to distinguish between the 'damaged' property 
which is a requisite for a finding of compensability, and the 
'damages' by which courts measure compensation due. Rea-
soning backwards, plaintiffs erroneously contend that since 
they can calculate damages (by measuring the decline in market 
value), they must have been 'damaged.'97 
Quite clearly, a showing of a decrease in property value, even when 
significant, is not necessarily sufficient to warrant a finding of unconstitu-
tionality or awarding of compensation as a remedy, if so found. Where 
92. William C. Haas & Co. v. San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980). 
93. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
94. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 
125 Cal. Rptr. 508, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1975). 
95. See Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Pompa Const. 
Corp. v. City of Saratoga Springs, 706 F.2d 418 (1983); Rogers v. Town of Brookha-
ven, 39 Misc. 2d 927, 242 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1963) (85% diminution); Urann v. Village 
ofHinedale, 30 Ill. 2d 170, 195 N.E.2d 643 (1964) (69% diminution); Brown v. City 
of Fremont, 75 Cal. App. 3d 141, 142 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1978) (81% devaluation); 
Arnold v. Prince George's County, 270 Md. 285, 311 A.2d 223 (1973) (no taking 
where $32,100 devaluation alleged due to road placement); Norbeck Village Joint 
Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969) (alleged 
66% reduction in value due to downzoning, thus no taking found); Marino v. City 
of Baltimore, 215 Md. 206, 137 A.2d 198 (1957) (refusal to grant permit alleged to 
reduce value from $140,000 to $14,000 held no confiscation); City of Baltimore v. 
Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 212 A.2d 508 (1965); Neubauer v. Town of Surfside, 181 
So.2d 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (property worth 69% less as zoned than as 
requested, held valid exercise of police powers and legislative discretion to refuse 
upzoning); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. App. 2d 45, 264 
N.E.2d 730 (1970) (value disparity between zoning requested and current zoning 
not determinative, local decision upheld); Lapukus Builders v. City of Chicago, 30 
Ill. 2d 304, 196 N.E.2d 682 (1964); Martin v. City of Rockford, 27 Ill. 2d 273, 189 
N.E.2d 280 (1963); Raynor v. Rockville Centre, 62 Misc. 2d 870, 310 N.Y.S.2d 210 
(1969); Maywood Proviso State Bank v. Berkeley, 5111. App. 2d 84, 204 N.E.2d 144 
( 1965) (plaintiff who bought property with full knowledge of existing zoning had no 
valid complaint that higher density would yield 65% more value); Joyce v. City of 
Portland, 24 Or. App. 689, 546 P.2d 1100 (1976). Contra La Salle National Bank of 
Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957); Frantz v. Village of 
Morton Grove, 28 Ill. 2d 246, 190 N.E.2d 790 (1963). 
96. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 
125 Cal. Rptr. 365, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1975). 
97. /d. at 518, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372. 
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the need for the regulation is compelling, courts generally will not find a 
taking, even where private interests are affected substantially. The gen-
eral rule is that if the property owner can make reasonable economic use 
of the property, no taking will be found, even if that use earns a substan-
tially lower profit than the original or planned use. 
Comparing the case law on the value diminution issue to the action 
undertaken by the Commission, one could conclude logically that even a 
significant diminution in value would not serve, by itself, to invalidate the 
RCA's "one per twenty" criterion. While "reasonable investment-
backed expectations"98 of property owners are relevant to a determina-
tion of the overall constitutionality of a regulation, economic injury to 
prospective uses does not necessarily constitute a taking.99 Offsetting the 
apparent harshness of the "one per twenty" regulation is the fact that 
various economically viable resource utilization activities such as farm-
ing or timbering may continue in the RCAs, as may residential land uses 
at low density. Moreover, the density restrictions of the regulation may 
be modified somewhat by the local programs' application of such mecha-
nisms as "transferable development rights" 100 and various other flexibil-
98. The phrase "reaso!lable investment-backed expectations" used by Justice Brennan 
in Penn Central can be explained as follows: "reasonable expectations" are those 
that may be justified by a rational and logical analysis of all the available facts; 
"investment-backed" generally refers to money spent in reliance upon those expec-
tations. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25. 
99. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104. On the other hand, it is important to note that a taking 
might well be found where a property has been rendered substantially useless. The 
mere remainder of title, or the right to exclude others, without more, is not enough 
of the bundle of rights remaining to keep a taking from occurring. Curtis v. Main, 
482 A.2d 1253 (Me. 1984). There are several United States Court of Claims cases 
where an analysis of such a taking is made. E.g., Benenson v. United States, 548 
F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (denial of right to make significant changes to Willard Ho-
tel); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, U.S. Ct. CI., No. 266-82L, May 6, 1985 
(Corps of Engineers denial of permit to mine limestone held a taking because no 
other viable use of property remained). The latter case analyzed the remaining bun-
dle of rights by defendants to be still present (the right to sell, lease, restrict or 
permit access, etc.) as largely illusory, and found that there will always be some 
residual market value, but that it was too speculative a value to consider. These are 
indeed relevant considerations, although it appears that the Florida Rock court may 
well have stepped outside the mainstream of takings law in its examination of and 
conclusions regarding these issues, given the facts before it. In fact, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit disagreed with the most significant 
part of the Claims Court's holding in that case, and vacated and remanded that 
holding in part. Florida Rock, 791 F.2d 893. The court of appeals determined that 
the residual market value, though speculative, was indeed a remaining value that 
required examination before a taking could be declared. If believed, the appraiser's 
assertion in this regard could represent a sufficient remaining use to forestall a deter-
mination that a taking had occurred. 791 F.2d at 903. 
100. Transferable development rights (TORs) refer to an evolving local planning tool in 
which the right to develop property is severed from other land ownership rights. 
Development rights of one parcel of land (the "sending" parcel), may then be trans-
ferred to another parcel (the "receiving" parcel). The tool generally helps preserve 
some features of the sending parcel and increases the density or changes develop-
ment in the receiving parcel. For case law discussing TORs, see infra note 113. 
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ity measures built into the regulations, some of which are discussed 
below. 101 
D. Relief Valves, Flexibility, and Mitigation 
Previous parts of section III of this article have examined several of 
the factors used in takings analysis in low density zoning cases and com-
pared these factors with the density regulation in the Commission's RCA 
criterion. As part of the takings law equation it is necessary to examine 
how other Critical Areas criteria may mitigate the effects of the "one in 
twenty" criterion and what impact such mitigating criteria may have 
upon whether "one in twenty" constitutes a taking. 102 
Of prime importance is the initial understanding that the Critical 
Area law generally affects only land within 1,000 feet of the shoreline and 
wetlands of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. Entire counties, cit-
ies and towns are, for the most part, unaffected. 103 Local jurisdictions 
may continue to regulate land use outside of the Critical Area as before. 
Thus, jurisdictions may "up-zone" in those areas outside the Critical 
Area to whatever densities their citizens and legislators believe is 
appropriate. 
Even within the Critical Area, the zoning regulations are not as ex-
tensive or burdensome as they initially may appear. First, it is essential 
to note what the Commission established. Of the three distinct manage-
ment areas into which the local jurisdictions must classify their Critical 
Area land, only the RCA is subject to the "one per twenty'' criterion. 
Moreover, by definition, RCA zones are already low density areas; RCAs 
are defined as areas with no more than one dwelling unit per five acres. 
Portions of the Critical Area in all jurisdictions will be classified as In-
tensely Developed and Limited Development Areas. On these lands 
moderate and intense development can continue within the Critical 
Area. 104 The Commission was attentive to the need for areas of higher 
intensity, as well as to the need for conservation areas of low intensity 
uses. Thus, just as whole zoning ordinances are judged in takings cases 
to determine whether various densities are provided, so too must the lo-
cal Critical Area Programs be judged in their entirety. 
Second, the Commission provided a variety of offsetting mecha-
nisms that would help local jurisdictions blunt the impact of Critical 
Area regulations and prevent the operation of the regulation from being 
viewed as a taking. The criteria, and thus the local implementing pro-
101. COMAR, supra note 5, §§ .15.01-.02. 
102. See Freilich & Senville, Taking, TDRs, and Environmental Preservation: 'Fairness' 
and the Hollywood North Beach Case, 35 Land Use Law and Zoning Digest 4 (Sep-
tember 1983). 
103. A county can choose to include much more or even all of its land area through its 
local program development; due to the economic effects of such inclusion, however, 
it is unlikely that many counties would expand the area to be regulated much be-
yond the minimum area specified in the Critical Areas legislation. 
104. COMAR, supra note 5, §§ .15.02.03-.04. 
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grams, permit variances in the case of unusual circumstances, special 
conditions, or unwarranted hardship. 105 Thus, relief from application of 
the criteria may be possible where application of the criteria would be too 
harsh and might otherwise constitute a taking. 
Third, the Commission provided for certain parcels of land to be 
"grandfathered" by local jurisdictions. Thus, for example, anyone with a 
lot or parcel of record when the criteria were promulgated may at least 
place a single house on that lot or parcel, regardless of the lot's size or 
location, as long as the building meets local requirements. 106 
Fourth, a "growth increment" was provided to local jurisdictions, 
based on five percent of the amount of RCA land each jurisdiction has. 107 
Statutory changes in the 1986 legislative session made this growth incre-
ment concept more readily available to underdeveloped counties. 108 In a 
related legislative clarification, landowners whose property includes large 
areas of wetlands may now count that unusable land area for density 
purposes on the upland portion of their parcels, up to a density of one 
unit per eight acres.109 
Finally, the Commission's regulations permit and encourage the use 
of transferable development rights (TDRs). 110 Once developed by the 
local jurisdiction, a TOR program in a local Critical Area might permit, 
for example, RCA property owners to sell their development rights 
outside the RCA to an owner in a local IDA or LOA "receiving" zone. 
TOR programs have been viewed favorably by the courts as mitigative 
measures in the overall takings equation. In Penn Central, 111 the United 
States Supreme Court stated that New York's potential transfer of the 
rights for development over Grand Central Terminal "undoubtedly miti-
gate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, 
for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering the impact of 
regulation." 112 Although the courts have not based "no taking" holdings 
completely on the presence of a TOR program, such programs do seem 
to be afforded great weight in considering the overall justice and fairness 
of the regulatory activity. 113 As stated by one commentator, "TORs rep-
105. /d. § .15.11. Local jurisdictions can vary their programs somewhat where special 
conditions or circunistances exist that are peculiar to the land or structure and lit-
eral enforcement of the criteria would result in unwarranted hardship. /d. 
106. /d. § .15.02.07. The Legislature also has provided for a limited ability to transfer 
property to family members in order to erect several structures. MD. NAT. RES. 
CODE ANN. § 8-1808.2 (Supp. 1986). 
107. COMAR, supra note 5, § .15.02.06. That is, the Commission has permitted the 
growth of intense land uses beyond those shown by its current land use. The growth 
increment is based on five percent of its RCA land area. /d.§ .15.01.06(A)(1). 
108. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1808.1(b) (Supp. 1986). 
109. /d.§ 8-1808.1(c). 
110. COMAR, supra note 5, § .15.02.05(C)(4). For a description ofTDRs, see supra note 
100. 
111. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
112. /d. at 137. 
113. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (TDR discussion by Court); DuFour v. 
Montgomery County Council, Law Nos. 56964, 56968, 56969, 56970, 56983, un-
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resent a right supplemental to the beneficial use allowed on [the property 
owner's] land." 114 
Upon examining the various measures designed to provide flexibility 
in the takings law equation it would seem that the Commission's RCA 
density criterion fares rather well. Devices which mitigate the perceived 
harshness of the regulation also serve to enhance its constitutionality. 
E. Vested Rights 
Private property owners adversely affected by a government action 
often advance the argument that they have a vested right in the status of 
their property prior to the government action. The general majority rule 
on this subject is straightforward: no vested rights are said to accrue in a 
particular zoning classification absent substantial good faith reliance 
thereon, usually in the form of reliance on a valid building permit. 115 
The approval of a plan and the filing for a permit generally do not place 
the lots shown on a subdivision plat beyond the power of future zoning 
changes, absent some express statutory provision to the contrary. 116 
Further, in Maryland, a concrete physical change arising from reliance 
on the building permit is required to vest rights in a development. The 
case law in Maryland has established that there must be actual construc-
tion on the ground before the judicial concept of vested rights will invali-
date the zoning change. 117 Thus, under Maryland law, a challenge to the 
"one per twenty" regulation based on a vested right in a particular pro-
posed land use would usually be untenable. 
Vested rights arguments are often wound up in, and confused with, 
takings claims. Sometimes they are jointly pled. The important point for 
the purpose of this article is that a takings claim supported or bolstered 
by a vested rights argument has, in Maryland, quite limited application 
to some very specific facts. 
published op. (January 20, 1983) (Montgomery County, Maryland downzoning of 
large land area to a one unit per twenty-five acres density upheld as no taking, with 
judge separately remarking on TOR scheme); City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, 
Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1983) (court held downzoning ofbeachfront not confis-
catory, finding that the TOR mechanism utilized there was not "offensive"). It 
must be noted, however, that a TOR mechanism on its own, as the sole means for 
balancing fairness and investment-backed expectations, may not be able to pull an 
otherwise clear taking out of an unconstitutional tailspin. Fred R. French lnv. Co. 
v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976). It remains important, 
for example, that the TORs created have adequate worth. It is also important for 
other aspects of the zoning program to accord with substantive and procedural 
fairness. 
114. Note, New Jersey's Pinelands Plan and the 'Taking' Question, 7 COLUM. J. ENVTL. 
L. 227, 238 (1982). 
115. City of Fort Pierce v. Davis, 400 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
116. R.A. Vachon & Son, Inc. v. Concord, 112 N.H. 107, 289 A.2d 646 (1972). 
117. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. TKU Assoc., 201 Md. 1, 376 A.2d 505 
(1977) (preliminary expenditures of over $1,500,000 not sufficient absent construc-
tion); County Council v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 337 A.2d 712 (1975). 
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F. Conclusion: The Effect on Private Property Interests 
Section III of this article has explored one of the most controversial 
of the Commission's regulations, its "one per twenty" density criterion. 
Downzonings, or zoning from a higher to a lower density, although oc-
curring regularly throughout the state and the nation, are naturally the 
subject of takings claims. 
Among the factors the courts have applied in the analysis of takings 
claims is the size of the purported taking, measured by whether the den-
sity is too low or whether the diminution of property value is too great. 
Neither variable can be stated in terms of a formula because a wide vari-
ety of other factors must be taken into consideration: the full range of 
benefit and burden; the presumptive validity accorded legislative actions; 
the degree of compliance with statutory purposes and guidance; the role 
of the particular regulation in the overall regulatory scheme for the par-
ticular geographical area; and the relative availability of mitigation, re-
lief, and general flexibility. 
Low density regulations have been overturned when found to be ar-
bitrary, enacted for inapproprite reasons, or without an adequate founda-
tion. On the other hand, large lot zoning and similar conservation 
mechanisms routinely have been upheld as valid when reasonably devel-
oped and adequately based, even where, in extreme cases, the zoning reg-
ulations allow for only one unit in as large an area as 50, 70 or 640 
acres. 118 In light of the Commission's research, rea.Soning, and process, 
its requirement would seem similarly valid. 
Concomitantly, there is no formula by which diminution in value is 
testect. Courts recently have upheld regulatory actions which diminish 
value from ninety-five through sixty percent, provided the other variables 
noted above are sufficiently present. 119 Reasonable economic use, not 
highest and best or most profitable use, is an oft-cited test. In Maryland 
the regulation must deprive the owner of "all reasonable use" before a 
taking will be found. 
The Commission's criteria provide for various mitigative mecha-
nisms, as well as considerable flexibility and reasonableness of applica-
tion. Densities that accommodate more intense development are 
provided within each locality's critical area as well as outside of it. Fur-
ther, the criteria provide for variances in the event of unwarranted hard-
ships; "grandfathering" of certain lands and development; a "growth 
increment" for future development; and importantly, TOR programs, 
should the local subdivision wish to enact them. Each of these, and all of 
them together, may tend to lend balance in purported takings situations 
though, of course, a parcel-specific situation may not present all or any of 
these variables. 
118. See supra noteS 94-95 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra note 95. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the legislative process of the Critical Ar-
eas criteria and a constitutional issue raised by the controversial low den-
sity zoning requirement contained in the regulations. Local downzoning 
usually will withstand constitutional takings claims if the zoning action is 
the result of rational study and review, achieves legitimate statutory pur-
poses, is implemented with adequate procedural safeguards allowing the 
affected public to be heard and allows for some reasonable use of the 
affected property. Local downzonings, undertaken properly to help 
achieve the Commission's low density criterion, would seem to meet 
these constitutional minimums. 
The Critical Area criteria have a rational basis inasmuch as they are 
specifically designed to meet the public objectives and minimum require-
ments set forth in the Critical Areas legislation. The criteria were devel-
oped after extensive research, . analysis and debate before the 
Commission. Similar environmental and resource conservation purposes 
are found generally in local jurisdictions' planning and zoning enabling 
legislation. 12° Case law nationwide, as well as in Maryland, generally has 
supported the imposition of strict land use regulation to implement such 
purposes. 121 
The entire package of Critical Area criteria is the result of innumer-
able reasoned judgments and compromises, based upon extensive study 
and deliberation. The criteria achieves a delicate balance of private 
rights and public necessity. Even the most controversial criterion, the 
"one per twenty" density criterion, is a logical, valid, and constitutional 
application of the State's police powers. What remains now is to see how 
effectively local authorities implement the Critical Areas criteria and 
what impact these actions will have in the future. 
120. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 66B, §§ 3.05, 4.01, 4.03 (1983 & Supp. 1985). 
121. See, e.g., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981), cert. 
denied sub nom. Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); S. Volpe & Co. v. Board 
of Appeals, 4 Mass. App. 357, 348 N.E.2d 807 (1976); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. 
v. Governor ofMd., 266 Md. 358,293 A.2d 241, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972). 
